REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
18-05-2004	FINAL		

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
In Search of a Unified Command for Africa	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Eugene Yim	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
Paper Advisor (if Any): Dr. John Ballard	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT
The missions, responsibilities, and force structure of a combatant command must adapt to changing strategic environment. As Africa undergoes intense transition, promise and opportunity exist side by side with the perils of civil war, transnational threats, infectious disease, and desperate poverty, which can significantly affect the U.S. national interests in the region. However, the current UCP arrangement—division of responsibility for Africa among three commands (USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM) and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa—does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy and meet the current and future challenges in Africa. The U.S. should give a higher priority to Africa by transferring USCENTCOM and USPACOM's African Areas of Responsibility to USEUCOM and establishing a sub-unified command for Africa under USEUCOM. Such a dedicated sub-unified command will allow more effective command structure to proactively shape the security environment in Africa and more effectively handle any threats to U.S. national interests in the region.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
unified command, UCP, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, Africa, terrorism

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
					Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE		25	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED			401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

In Search of a Unified Command for Africa

By

Eugene Yim
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

18 May 2004

_____
Faculty Advisor
Dr. John Ballard

Abstract

The missions, responsibilities, and force structure of a combatant command must adapt to changing strategic environment. As Africa undergoes intense transition, promise and opportunity exist side by side with the perils of civil war, transnational threats, infectious disease, and desperate poverty, which can significantly affect the U.S. national interests in the region. However, the current UCP arrangement—division of responsibility for Africa among three commands (USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM) and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa—does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy and meet the current and future challenges in Africa. The U.S. should give a higher priority to Africa by transferring USCENTCOM and USPACOM's African Areas of Responsibility to USEUCOM and establishing a sub-unified command for Africa under USEUCOM. Such a dedicated sub-unified command will allow more effective command structure to proactively shape the security environment in Africa and more effectively handle any threats to U.S. national interests in the region.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The changing strategic environment constantly affects the way the U.S. military organizes, prepares, and responds to those that threaten U.S. national interests. Since its inception in 1946, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) has been revised twenty times with numerous interim adjustments to reflect changes in strategic threat assessment, technology advances, and the growing world-wide commitment of U.S. forces.[1] The September 11, 2001 terror attack significantly influenced the direction of the U.S. National Security Strategy to focus on the global war on terror and altered the UCP structure, creating a unified command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), for the first time, to emphasize the defense of the homeland. The latest UCP, effective 1 October, 2002, now has five geographic and four functional unified commands.[2]

Under the current UCP, the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for the continent of Africa is divided among three regional unified commands: U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).[3] While the continent of Africa faces constant security, political, and economic crises,[4] none of these unified commands gives high priority to Africa. Yet, the continuing civil wars, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and the rising threat of international terrorism significantly affect the U.S. national interests in that region. Most of the African nations are not capable of dealing with these serious problems alone. The U.S. should give a higher priority to Africa by transferring USCENTCOM and USPACOM's African AORs to USEUCOM and establishing a sub-unified command for Africa under USEUCOM. Such a dedicated sub-unified command will allow more effective command structure to proactively shape the security environment in Africa and more effectively handle any threats to U.S.

national interests in the region.   This paper will examine the history of UCP with respect to Africa, the U.S. national interests and policy toward Africa, the U.S. military activities in Africa, and investigate UCP alternatives for Africa.

The UCP and Africa[5]

Since the creation of the UCP in 1946, the first assignment of responsibility for a part of Africa to a unified command occurred in December 1952. Recognizing the historical ties between Europe and North Africa, USEUCOM was given the responsibility for the Algerian Departments of France, as well as the joint planning responsibility for French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and military aspects of negotiations for basing rights. In November 1960, Communist penetration of the chaos-ridden Congo prompted then Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Robert McNamara, to assign Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) the responsibility for plans and operations in sub-Saharan Africa for the first time. In July 1961, the SECDEF apportioned the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in sub-Saharan Africa and Congo air evacuation mission to USEUCOM. In November 1963, however, the SECDEF gave the newly established Strike Command (USSTRICOM) the responsibility for planning and operations in sub-Sahara Africa, along with the Middle East and Southern Asia. As a result, USEUCOM's mission was reduced to NATO-Europe and North Africa west of Egypt, making the command more accurately a "European Command." In 1971, when USSTRICOM was disestablished, the sub-Saharan Africa was again left unassigned; it remained so for the next 12 years.

During the mid to late 1970s, communist powers (the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China) were heavily committed in sub-Saharan region where the U.S. presence was minimal. The geo-strategic location of Africa, at the crossroads of two oceans and three seas, straddled air

and sea lines of communication linking North America and Europe to the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific islands. The sub-Saharan Africa contained ample natural resources essential for industry. The U.S. planners realized the importance of the region since growing communist influence in the region could deny the U.S. access to bases, ports, air/sea lanes, and raw materials and possibly threaten the lives of some 35,000 Americans living there.[6]

In October 1983, as a signal to allies and adversaries of the strategic importance of the sub-Saharan region to the U.S., the President approved a new UCP. He assigned the entire sub-Saharan region along with the North African states to USEUCOM, recognizing the longstanding links between certain European nations and their former colonies. The responsibility for the nations in the waters surrounding Africa remained with either the Atlantic or Pacific commands. The island of Madagascar was assigned to USPACOM as it impinged upon USPACOM's mission of protecting U.S. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean.[7] The nations in northeast Africa (Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and eventually Eritrea, Sudan, and the island nation of Seychelles) were assigned to USCENTCOM when it was activated in 1983 as "the permanent successor to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a temporary organization created by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 to project American power in the Middle East and East Africa."[8] This division of responsibilities for Africa has remained relatively unchanged through the post-Cold War period. Today, USEUCOM and USCENTCOM continue to have the responsibilities for the continent of Africa, while USPACOM continues to include Madagascar.

U.S. National Interests/Policy for Africa

The U.S. has growing national interests in Africa. As noted in the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush Administration recognizes the importance of Africa to the U.S. and global security and outlines three interlocking strategies to promote a democratic, secure, and prosperous Africa:

- countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention;

- coordination with European allies and international institutions is essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations; and

- Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.[9]

While the Bush Administration has shown a strong commitment to the future of Africa, it fell short of listing specifically what national interests lie in Africa. The Department of Defense (DoD) strategy for sub-Saharan Africa, published in August 2001, highlights energy and mineral supply, transnational dangers, infectious disease, and conflicts in Africa as prominent U.S. interests.[10]

The U.S. has a keen interest in securing and diversifying its energy supply from West and Central Africa, primarily from Nigeria, Angola, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.[11] Oil supply disruptions in Venezuela in 2002 and 2003 and the U.S. armed intervention in Iraq in 2003 strengthened U.S. effort to diversify U.S. energy supplies, especially from sources outside the Persian Gulf.[12] Currently, the sub-Saharan Africa provides sixteen percent of U.S. oil requirement. With proven African oil reserves reaching over sixty billion barrels (compared to 22 billion barrels of U.S. reserves), the strategic value of sub-Saharan Africa

will be even more significant in the coming years. By 2015, the U.S. is projected to draw twenty five percent of its oil from West Africa, surpassing the amount imported from the Persian Gulf.[13] The U.S. will also increasingly rely on West and Central Africa to meet projected rising demand for natural gas. As current development projects mature in Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, West Africa's capacity will increase from 9 million to 30-40 million tons per year within a decade.[14] In addition to crude oil and natural gas, the region has abundant deposits of critical resources for U.S. industries, such as gold, diamonds, copper, bauxite, uranium, manganese, and cobalt.[15] With its vast natural resources, Africa will remain strategically important to the U.S.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a significant impact on the direction of the U.S. strategy. Defeating global terrorism and preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its friends became a top national priority.[16] A senior Pentagon official, Vincent Kern, declared that "Africa has been, is now, and will be into the foreseeable future ripe for terrorists and acts of terrorism."[17] While poverty and instability alone do not necessarily breed terrorists, nations with weak civil societies and poor law enforcement and judicial systems are extremely vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by transnational terrorists.[18] Osama bin Laden, who organized September 11 attacks, once found safe haven in Sudan in the 1990s. Somalia, with a dysfunctional government, instability, and porous borders, serves as a potential staging ground for international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda threat continues to grow in East African countries including Kenya and Tanzania.[19]

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, on 5 April 2004, remarked that "HIV/AIDS is the greatest threat of mankind today, the greatest weapon of mass destruction on the earth today: killing 8,000 people every day."[20] The devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in

Africa is well known. According to the United Nations, some 28 million people in sub-Saharan Africa now live with HIV/AIDS. In January of 2000, the U.S. National Intelligence Council identified HIV/AIDS pandemic as a serious threat to U.S. national security. The HIV/AIDS is decimating the ranks of many African armed forces, including Zimbabwe (with a 50% infection rate), Angola (40 to 60%), Tanzania (15 to 30%), Congo-Brazzaville (10 to 25%), Côte d'Ivoire (10 to 20%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (40 to 60%), Eritrea (10 %), and Nigeria (10 to 20%).[21]   In South Africa, a country with the largest professional military in southern Africa, has reached a biblical proportions, with the infection rates in some units reaching up to 90%. As the pandemic continues, the African militaries will loose significant manpower. The effects of the disease on African armed forces will be profound as witnessed in 1999 during a peacekeeping exercise, Operation Blue Crane, where more than thirty percent of the South African participants were medically unfit for deployment.[22] Many African countries—with their militaries dramatically weakened by the disease—will likely lose control over their national security and public order, profoundly impacting the regional stability.

In his radio address following the tour of sub-Saharan Africa in July 2003, President Bush announced "progress in Africa depends on peace and stability, so America is standing with friends and allies to help end regional wars."[23] In the past decades, various forms of internal and cross-border violence created regional instability that inhibited Africa's development to its full potential. The conflict resulting from civil wars, insurgencies, banditry, oppressive regimes, border disputes, interstate aggression, or any other violent circumstances provoke large-scale flow of refugees, ravaged infrastructure, famine, and disease.[24] Today, as two of the three largest powers in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and

Angola's role would be critical to their neighbors' security.[25] The U.S. has strong interest in

expanding these African nations' capability to mitigate conflict on the continent. Regional

stability is the fundamental U.S. national interest in Africa. Virtually all other U.S. interests

would be threatened if regional stability is not achieved.

U.S. Military Activities in Africa

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military have conducted some thirty contingency

operations in Africa.[26] These military interventions include "noncombatant evacuations from

Liberia (1990, 1996), Somalia (1991), Zaire/Congo (1991), Sierra Leone (1992, 1997),

Rwanda (1994), and the Central African Republic (1996); humanitarian relief operations in

Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Central Africa (1996); election support in Angola

(1992); support of UN withdrawal from Somalia (1995); and support to deployment of the

monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) in

Liberia (1997)."[27] The U.S. military also provided security, medical support, and

investigation services following the terrorist bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi and

Dar-es-Salaam in 1998.[28] In August 2003, the civil war in Liberia prompted 200 U.S. troops

in Monrovia "to help facilitate the arrival of a larger West African peacekeeping force."[29]

Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. has become increasingly concerned about

terrorist activities, especially in the Horn of Africa, where terrorists have been known to find

safe havens. Accordingly, the U.S. created a Combined Joint Task Force (JTF) for the Horn

of Africa in 2002.[30] The JTF, now consisting of 1,800 troops, is engaged in a range of joint

military exercises with local military forces and civil-military operations such as hospital and

school renovation. Subsequently, in June 2003, President Bush announced a $100M, 15-

month Eastern Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative to expand U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in

Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, and Eritrea.

Another area of DoD concern is the West and Central Africa. The UN Security Council's investigation has found widespread criminal activity in West Africa, involving money laundering and commodities smuggling, that benefit Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah terrorists.[31] In the last two years, the USEUCOM has significantly increased its efforts in Africa:

> It has concluded multiple new bilateral military-access agreements; launched the Pan Sahel Initiative to build counterterrorism capacities in Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali; doubled naval visits and begun exploring means to strengthen host-country coast guards. Also under active consideration are expanded U.S. programs of peacekeeping training and support for West African and other African troops, for deployment into African crisis situations.[32]

In recognizing the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the U.S. national security, the DoD created the HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, in 2000, to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS infections among world's militaries.[33] Today, the priority lies in sub-Saharan Africa. USEUCOM and USCENTCOM have actively participated in this program to help curtail the pandemic spread of disease in African militaries.[34] Working closely with Department of State, Centers for Disease Control, and U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. military is currently involved with 27 African militaries, providing HIV/AIDS test kits and assisting them with their HIV/AIDS prevention programs.[35]

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), established by the DoD in 1999, also highlights the U.S's commitment for Africa. The ACSS is DoD's premier engagement program that offers relatively low cost, but highly effective security cooperation opportunities.[36] Through a series of seminars, symposia, conferences, and outreach

programs, the U.S. civilian and military leaders have worked closely with African partners to bring stable governance and democratic values in Africa.

In Search of a Unified Command for Africa

The U.S. military is likely to engage in Africa when a crisis erupts or its national interests are threatened. While the U.S. military needs to remain vigilant and ready to respond to potential crises, it must also take a proactive role in shaping Africa's security environment. One way is to create a unified command or a sub-unified command to specifically focus on African affairs.[37] This section examines three alternatives: status quo, create a sub-unified command within either USEUCOM or USCENTCOM.

Option 1: Status Quo

A main issue regarding the current unified command structure is Africa's division among three unified commands: USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. Each of these regional commands encompasses a vast AOR, with astounding political, economic, ethnic, cultural, religious, and social diversity. Challenges that USEUCOM faces to effectively operate in Africa are especially overwhelming as its AOR encompasses over 46 million square miles,[38] covering 49 countries in Europe, including Russia and former Soviet Bloc, 42 countries in Northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and Israel in the Middle East.[39] USCENTCOM's has the responsibility for a total of 27 countries that encompasses 6.4 million square miles throughout Arabian Peninsula, South and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa regions.[40] USCENTCOM's AOR includes eight countries in Africa: Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Seychelles. USPACOM, which includes 43 countries and 20 territories and possessions over 105 million square miles—more than 50%

of earth's surface, is responsible for the island nation of Madagascar, located in the Indian Ocean, east of Mozambique.[41]

The problem with "divided responsibility" for Africa among various regional commands is that it decreases the potential for any combatant commander to effectively influence and manage African affairs, especially when faced with other daunting missions. As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the combatant commander of USEUCOM's main focus is on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European security.[42] Furthermore, USEUCOM provides critical support to USCENTCOM in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). USEUCOM is a linchpin in multi-national Balkan operations, including Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.[43]

In the past two years, USCENTCOM's main effort has been combating terrorism in Afghanistan (OEF) and Iraq (OIF). In Afghanistan, following successful operations to destroy Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and infrastructure and to end terrorist activities, the U.S. civil-military forces along with coalition partners, are fully engaged in reconstructing that nation. In Iraq, over 100,000 U.S troops, working closely with a civilian team (led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer) and coalition partners, are conducting counter-insurgency operations, as well as helping rebuild Iraq by "forming and training police, security forces, and the New Iraqi Army; improving the infrastructure; supporting the establishment of local government and providing emergency medical care and other humanitarian assistance."[44]

In USPACOM, the main effort is clearly on promoting a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, where a number of security concerns exist, including Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, China, and Kashmir.[45]

Given each command's many roles, the three commands have viewed Africa as the area of secondary concern and paid it limited attention. The involvement of U.S. forces in Africa has been largely reactive, only responding to crises as they occur, rather than proactively shape the African strategic environment.[46] The combatant commander of USEUCOM, Marine General James L. Jones, admitted that "We don't pay enough attention to Africa, but I think we're going to have to in the 21st century."[47]

The world's strategic environment has changed dramatically since the end of Cold War. The era of bi-polar and symmetrical security landscape is gone. Today, the U.S. is faced with non-state, asymmetrical terrorist threats in its homeland and around the globe.[48] The new U.S. National Security Strategy clearly identifies the global war on terrorism as a top priority and highlights the importance of Africa's stability to the U.S. security. The current UCP arrangement—division of responsibility for Africa among three commands and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa—does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy and meet the current and future challenges in Africa. The current UCP arrangement "makes it difficult for the U.S. to prioritize its regional security interests and pursue them consistently. The differing organizational cultures and geographical focuses of the unified commands, along with the differing personalities of their leaders, lend an unfortunate subjectivity to US security relationships in Africa."[49]

Option 2: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USEUCOM

A dedicated sub-unified command with exclusive responsibility for Africa would greatly enhance U.S. military operations to foster peace and stability in that region. Recognizing the dramatic security environment changes that have taken place, General Jones initiated the reshaping of the U.S. forces in European theater to better meet the future needs

since he took over the command in January 2003. As a part of his transformation effort, he has significantly stepped up USEUCOM's role in Africa. His view is that countering terrorism in Africa is the first line of defense for the homeland.[50] By creating favorable conditions and preventing incidents in Africa, the terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland can be mitigated. USEUCOM is actively "building ties with sub-Saharan militaries, conducting combined training-outreach exercises and providing key capabilities to states to bolster their security."[51] USEUCOM's transformation also includes possibilities for opening new forward operating bases and training ranges in Africa.[52] Potential candidates for the U.S. military presence include Mali in North Africa, where terrorist groups are believed to have set up camps and supply lines in ungoverned desert areas; Sao Tome, a small nation off of the coast of West Africa near Nigeria—the region that supplies fifteen percent of U.S. energy requirements; and Congo and Uganda for setting up refueling capability for strategic airlift.[53] As the training grounds in Western Europe diminish due to increasing restrictions on operating hours, cost, limitations on the types of weapons used, and the size of forces involved in training, the countries in Northern Africa, such as Morocco and Tunisia, offer better training opportunities with considerably less restrictions.[54]

Given USEUCOM's unprecedented leadership in Africa, it would be prudent to assign all of African countries to the purview of USEUCOM and create a sub-unified command for Africa. The commander of this sub-unified command can then fully dedicate his effort on African affairs to shape the security environment in the region. A more focused leadership would result in better support, intelligence analysis, and operational planning.[55] A dedicated headquarters would also enhance interagency efforts by focusing on key political-military problems with other federal agencies. Shaping the environment is a far more

attractive option in achieving U.S. strategic objectives than resorting to expensive military

operations to resolve crisis.

Option 3: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USCENTCOM

The value of a sub-unified command within USCENTCOM would be similar to that

of a sub-unified command within USEUCOM as they both provide a focused leadership for

Africa. The question is whether creating a sub-unified command within USCENTCOM is a

better alternative than the one within USEUCOM. A proponent of this idea argues that

Africa and the Middle East are a more appropriate grouping for U.S. security interests since

Africa shares more common interests in matters of transnational threats, oil supply, and

Islamic population, with the Middle East.[56] Although there are some cultural, religious, and

economic similarities between some countries in Africa (particularly in the Northeast region)

and in the Middle East, creating a new headquarters within USCENTCOM would be a less

viable option at this time as USCENTCOM's priority would continue to lie on OEF and OIF

for the foreseeable future. Moreover, USEUCOM's recurrent involvement in military

operations in the Horn of Africa—a region USCENTCOM is responsible for—makes

USEUCOM a more suitable candidate. Even today, USEUCOM is working with

USCENTCOM, operating in the Horn of Africa, hunting down terrorist cells.[57] With

USEUCOM's renewed leadership for Africa, a sub-unified command would be better served

subordinate to USEUCOM.

<div align="center">

Recommendations

</div>

The Administration should establish a sub-unified command for Africa within

USEUCOM. This sub-regional headquarters would have several advantages. It can

explicitly focus on African security issues and facilitate long-term, coherent programs to

shape the regional environment; it would be much less distracted to other missions in Europe, Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; it can maintain better communication with African partners and with U.S. diplomats in the region to provide better warning of imminent crises, a better understanding of African interests, and perhaps more options for crisis management than are available today; and it would certainly signify Africa's importance to the U.S and a long-term U.S. commitment to regional stability and development.[58]

To better support the missions of the sub-unified command for Africa, the Administration's foreign policy for Africa should include the following:

- *Place a higher priority on fighting global terrorism in Africa*.[59] The U.S. should increase its effort to coordinate security measures with African countries that are most susceptible to terrorist influence. The U.S. should be prepared to take pre-emptive action as a self-defense measure when the terrorist threat is imminent.

- *Support the establishment of an African intervention force*.[60] The U.S. should encourage leading African nations, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola, to take on the burden of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In the past, many of these African nations' efforts have been a disappointment due to corruption, inadequate resources, and poor training. Helping to foster the development of African militaries is essential to enhance their capacity to intervene to stop genocide, deal with humanitarian crises, and fight terrorism.

- *Assist African states with the specific military support they need*.[61] In the event of the U.S. military intervention, the U.S. should assist African militaries with needed capabilities, including air and naval transport, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, communications, logistics, and perhaps some force

protection assets, to enhance their operational capabilities. The multinational

intervention in East Timor, in 1999, is a good example, where the U.S. military provided

staff and logistical support for the vital humanitarian operations.

- *Provide a strong support for theater security cooperation.*[62] Active security cooperation

    program is a key to success in gaining basing, staging, over-flight rights, intelligence, and

    forces, as well as other forms of support. The program should be in place during the

    peacetime to build strong mutual trust and improve Africa's peacekeeping capabilities

    and overall regional stability. The Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales

    programs are essential for modernizing the military forces of key African partners, which

    give access to U.S. military goods, services, and expertise. International Military

    Education and Training is particularly important in Africa as it provides educational

    opportunities that emphasize and reinforce civilian control of the military and promote

    domestic stability. Small investment in sound theater security cooperation program

    would go a long way in assuring long-term benefits.

- *Continue to focus on interagency effort.*[63] Military is only one element of our national

    instruments of power. Diplomatic, economic, and information elements must work

    harmoniously with the military to achieve the maximum effect. As such, the interagency

    relationship and coordination is critical, especially between the combatant commander

    and the Ambassador in the host nation. USEUCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination

    Group provides a great forum to exploit capabilities of the U.S. government agencies and

    to synchronize non-military efforts with military capabilities.

Conclusion

The missions, responsibilities, and force structure of a combatant command must adapt to changing strategic environment. As Africa undergoes intense transition, promise and opportunity exist side by side with the perils of civil war, transnational threats, infectious disease, and desperate poverty, which can significantly affect the U.S. national interests in the region. However, the current UCP arrangement—division of responsibility for Africa among three commands and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa—does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy.   The U.S. must take a more proactive approach to shape the security environment in Africa. With USEUCOM's renewed leadership for Africa and USCENTCOM's priority on OEF and OIF, a dedicated sub-unified command for Africa would be best served under USEUCOM. Such a focused leadership will allow the U.S. to more effectively handle any threats to U.S. national interests in the region and foster Africa's security and stability. A peaceful and prosperous Africa would greatly enhance the U.S. security.

NOTES

[1] "Unified Command Plan Changes in USEUCOM Since 1952," 14 July 2003. Lkd. "United States European Command Page," <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/News/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/aor/history.htm&2> [10 April 2004].

[2] Five geographic unified commands are U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); four functional unified commands are U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

[3] Unified Command Plan, 30 April 2002.

[4] "DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa," August 2001, Lkd. "Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs Page," <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/afrindex.html> [10 April 2004].

[5] Ronald H. Cole and others, The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993 (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 1995), 9, 30, 33-34, 40, 64-66, 83-85; Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter 2000/2001): 103-104.

[6] Ronald H. Cole and others, The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993 (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 1995), 65.

[7] Ibid., 84.

[8] "About CENTCOM," Lkd. "United States Central Command Page," <http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/centcom.htm> [28 April 2004].

[9] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 11.

[10] "DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa." Some scholars also attempted to define U.S. interests in Africa, including Den Henk who identified 11 interrelated interest areas: U.S. access to key persons, institutions, facilities, and economic opportunity; information and warning; safety of American citizens; region free of weapons of mass destruction; region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats; regional comity and cooperation; freedom from egregious suffering; regional governance that is humane, managerially competent, and accountable (good governance); sustained economic development, and unthreatened natural environment. Dan Henk, "US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa," Parameters, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1997/1998): 92-107.

[11] David L. Goldwyn and J. Stephen Morrison. Promoting Transparency in the African Oil Sector, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2004), 1-2.

[12] Ibid., 4.

[13] James J. Carafano and Nile Gardiner. U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution. Backgrounder No. 1697. (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 15 October 2003), 2.

[14] Goldwyn and Morrison, 4.

[15] "DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa."

[16] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 5-7.

[17] Vincent Kern, a Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, addressed to more than 120 senior African military and civilian officials from 44 African nations at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) seminar on 10 Feb 2004. "Africa is Still Rife for Terrorism, Top Pentagon Official Asserts," 10 February 2004, Lkd. February 2004 Security News at "Global Security.Org Page," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/02/sec-040210-usia02.htm> [28 April 2004].

[18] Carafano and Gardiner, 3.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Remarks by "Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Gheskio Clinic Port-au-Prince, Haiti." 5 April 2004. <http://www.usembassy.it/file2004_04/alia/a4040602.htm> [28 April 2004].

[21] Kevin A. O'Brien, "Headlines over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 292. N0. 1 (July/August 2003) <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/07/rand.htm> [10 April 2004]: 84-90.

[22] Ibid.

[23] George E. Gurry, "Will Bush keep promise made to Africa?" 21 July 2003, <http://www.louisianaweekly.com/cgi-bin/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?20030721m> [10 April 2004].

[24] These violence include "conflict between warlords in 'failed states' (Liberia or Somalia during the 1990s); violent border disputes; interstate aggression (such as committed by South Africa against its neighbors during the apartheid era or by Libya against Chad in the mid-1980s); civil wars (in Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sudan); insurgencies (such as that in Rwanda or those … conducted by Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali); large-scale banditry; oppressive regimes (like Nigeria in the 1990s); and other unsettled or violent circumstances which provoke large-scale flows of refugees."; Dan Henk, "US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa," Parameters, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1997/1998): 96.

[25] Goldwyn and Morrison,12.

[26] "DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa."

[27] Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter 2000/2001): 115.

[28] "DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa."

[29] Carafano and Gardiner, 3.

[30] "Africa is Still Rife for Terrorism, Top Pentagon Official Asserts," 10 February 2004, Lkd. February 2004 Security News at "Global Security.Org Page," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/02/ sec-040210-usia02.htm> [28 April 2004].

[31] Michael Killian. "NATO Chief Forecasts Military Role in Africa." Chicago Tribune, 29 April 2003.

[32] Goldwyn and Morrison, 4.

[33] Bruce Greenburg, "Pentagon Helping Other Militaries Build AIDS Prevention Programs," 17 February 2004, <http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Feb/18-124632.html> [10 April 2004].

[34] "Policy Options for United States Support to Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration in Sub-Saharan Africa." May 2003. Lkd. "Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs Page." <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/afrindex.html> [10 April 2004]: 10.

[35] Greenburg.

[36] "Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Commander United States European Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee," 10 April 2003 (Resubmitted to OCJCS 5 May 2003), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/jones.pdf> [28 April 2004]: 31.

[37] Reorganizing UCP, especially creating a new unified command, requires an extensive study, evaluating key issues, such as "plans and operations; political-military and interagency responsibilities; other missions; organization, components and staff (including Reserve and Guard); C4I responsibilities, facilities; and impact on Services, other combatant commands, and any future UCP reorganization." (Terms of Reference Americas Command Study, 5 February 2004: 2.) A sub-unified command is a smaller organization focused on a particular region within a unified command. Examples of the sub-unified command are U.S. Forces in Korea and U.S. Forces in Japan, which are subordinate to USPACOM. For Africa, it would seem more practical in today's environment to consider establishing a sub-unified command rather than a unified-command. Hence, the analysis of alternatives were limited to creation of a sub-unified command.

[38] Ibid., 4.

[39] "Area of Responsibility (AOR)." 25 March 2004. Lkd. "United States European Command Page." <http://www.eucom.mil/aor/index.htm> [April 28, 2004].

[40] Catoire, 111.

[41] "PACOM Facts… Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command." Lkd. "U.S. Pacific Command." <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml> [April 28, 2004].

[42] John E. Campbell "Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan." Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002): 73.

[43] "Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Commander United States European Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee," 25-26.

[44] "Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," 9 July 2003, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/ franks_09july03.pdf> [28 April 2004]: 4.

[45] "Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on U.S. Pacific Command Posture," 26 June 2003, <http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov /usinfo/2003/ 062601.htm> [28 April 2004]: 1.

[46] Catoire, 112.

[47] Jon R. Anderson, "Transforming EUCOM, Part 3: Zeroing in on the African continent," <u>Stars and Stripes</u>, 17 June 2003, <http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15478&archive=true> [20 April 2004].

[48] "Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Commander United States European Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee," 5.

[49] Catoire, 110.

[50] "U.S. European Command stepping up efforts in sub-Sahara Africa." <u>Inside the Pentagon</u>. November 6, 2003. <http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum= PENTAGON-19-45-1> [18 April 2004].

[51] Ibid.

[52] Anderson.

[53] John T. Correll, "European Command Looks South and East." <u>Air Force Magazine</u>, Vol. 86, No. 12, (December 2003): 62-63.

[54] "Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Commander United States European Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee," 9.

[55] Carafano and Gardiner, 6.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Anderson.

[58] Catoire, 114.

[59] Carafano and Gardiner, 7-8.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] "Testimony of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander United States European Command Before the House Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives," 24 March 2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/04-03-24jones.htm> [14 May 2004]: 15-16.

[63] Ibid., 17-18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"About CENTCOM." Lkd. "United States Central Command Page."
    <http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/centcom.htm> [28 April 2004].

"Africa is Still Rife for Terrorism, Top Pentagon Official Asserts." 10 February 2004. Lkd.
    <u>February 2004 Security News</u> at "Global Security.Org Page."
    <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/02/sec-040210-usia02.htm> [28 April 2004].

Anderson, Jon R. "Transforming EUCOM, Part 3: Zeroing in on the African continent."
    <u>Stars and Stripes</u>. 17 June 2003. <http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15478&archive=true> [20 April 2004].

"Area of Responsibility (AOR)." 25 March 2004. Lkd. "United States European Command
    Page." <http://www.eucom.mil/aor/index.htm> [April 28, 2004].

Campbell, John E. "Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan." <u>Joint Forces
    Quarterly</u>, No. 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002).

Carafano, James J. and Nile Gardiner. <u>U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution</u>.
    Backgrounder No. 1697. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 15 October
    2003.

Catoire, Richard G. "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command
    Plan." <u>Parameters</u>, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter 2000/2001).

Cole, Ronald H., Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Williard J.
    Webb. <u>The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993</u>. Joint History Office,
    Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 1995.

Correll, John T. "European Command Looks South and East." <u>Air Force Magazine</u>, Vol. 86,
    No. 12, (December 2003).

"DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa." August 2001. Lkd. "Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs Page."
    <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/afrindex.html> [10 April 2004].

Goldwyn, David L. and J. Stephen Morrison. <u>Promoting Transparency in the African Oil
    Sector</u>. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March
    2004.

Greenburg, Bruce. "Pentagon Helping Other Militaries Build AIDS Prevention Programs."
    17 February 2004. <http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Feb/18-124632.html> [10
    April 2004].

Gurry, George E. "Will Bush keep promise made to Africa?" 21 July 2003.
    <http://www.louisianaweekly.com/cgi-bin/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?20030721m>
    [10 April 2004].

Henk, Dan. "US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa." Parameters, Vol. XXVII, No. 4
    (Winter 1997/1998).

Killian, Michael. "NATO Chief Forecasts Military Role in Africa." Chicago Tribune. 29
    April 2003.

O'Brien, Kevin A. "Headlines over the Horizon: AIDS and African Armies." Atlantic
    Monthly. Vol. 292, No. 1 (July/August 2003) <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/
    2003/07/rand.htm> [10 April 2004].

"PACOM Facts… Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command." Lkd. "U.S. Pacific Command."
    <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml> [April 28, 2004].

"Policy Options for United States Support to Demobilization, Demilitarization and
    Reintegration in Sub-Saharan Africa." May 2003. Lkd. "Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, Office of African
    Affairs Page." <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/afrindex.html> [10 April
    2004].

"Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at the Gheskio Clinic Port-au-Prince, Haiti." 5 April
    2004. <http://www.usembassy.it/file2004_04/alia/a4040602.htm> [28 April 2004].

"Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
    before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the
    Pacific on U.S. Pacific Command Posture." 26 June 2003.
    <http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/usinfo/2003/062601.htm> [28 April 2004].

"Statement of General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC, Commander United States European
    Command. The Senate Armed Services Committee." 10 April 2003 (Resubmitted to
    OCJCS 5 May 2003). <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/
    2003_hr/jones.pdf> [28 April 2004].

"Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander U.S. Central Command,
    Before the Senate Armed Services Committee." 9 July 2003.
    <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/franks_09july03.pdf> [28 April
    2004].

"Testimony of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander United States European Command Before the House Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives." 24 March 2004. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/04-03-24jones.htm> [14 May 2004].

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

"Unified Command Plan Changes in USEUCOM Since 1952." 14 July 2003. Lkd. "United States European Command Page." <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/News/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/aor/history.htm&2> [10 April 2004].

Unified Command Plan, 30 April 2002.

"U.S. European Command stepping up efforts in sub-Sahara Africa." Inside the Pentagon. November 6, 2003. <http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-19-45-1> [18 April 2004].